Appendix 3
KARATE BOB, LUBBERS AND THE MUSLIM
BOMB
Note: This article was translated from the Dutch internet
site Kleintje Muurkrant under the original title
“Lubbers en de Muzelmannenbom“; no author was mentioned. It appeared in 12
instalments from September 7 to October 18, 2005 and was first printed in
English as appendix nr. 2 in the novel Operation Twins II to supplement the appendices
8, 9 and 10 in Operation Twins I, in which Karate
Bob (alias for Slobodan R. Mitric) urges the then Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers
to finally live up to their million dollars contract, mentioned in The Golden
Tip and in detail below. The name of the intermediary between Karate Bob and
Lubbers, who was designated in Operation Twins I only by G. van H. and
in the original Dutch internet version of this series of articles by a certain
X, is here, on the authority of Slobodan Mitric, revealed for the first time:
it is Van Hulst, former head of the Dutch BVD (National Security Service),
which in 2002 became the AIVD (General Intelligence and Security Service).
I
It caused but a
wrinkle in the [Dutch] mainstream media: Lubbers pronouncement on August 9 of
this year [2005] that the CIA was informed from the beginning of the activities
of the Pakistani metallurgical engineer Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of the
Pakistani nuclear bomb. And that the Agency preferred him to let him go his
way. Supposedly to be able to map its network. Bullshit of course, but never
mind. After a couple of members of the [Dutch Prime Minister] Balkenende gang
declared the ex-premier more or less whoopee, and Lubbers himself did not come
up with more details, the story disappeared into the archives. In spite of the
fact that Ruud’s story, to which Krista van Velzen from the [Dutch] Parliament
had already given a prelude, had a formidable impact. We felt ourselves in fact
nicely ´blubberd´ and not for the first time either.
We have, as it happens, already
referred more often to another nuclear affair with which the womaniser from
Kralingen [a suburb of Rotterdam] has had to do in his political career. In
that context he got visit at home from two gentlemen on the evening of January
18, 1985. One of them he knew well. That was Jos Kieboom, his own consultant.
He did not know the other one. It was a Rotterdammer, who was acting as an
intermediary for the detained Slobodan Mitric, alias Karate Bob. The latter had
in the various state institutions, where he was detained in the eighties, heard
whispers in the grapevine concerning a secret nuclear deal between a business
delegation from the Dutch industry and a mixed delegation from the Middle East
plus in that context the theft of a sizable shipment of uranium.
Mitric claimed to know where that
uranium was and sought indirect contact with Prime Minister Lubbers. The latter
regarded the matter obviously that serious that he took steps to have Kieboom
arrange the afore-mentioned meeting with Mitric’s intermediary on January 18,
1985. Out of that meeting came the following list of demands made by Mitric as
articulated by his intermediary on January 30:
“Following the
delivery and affirmation of the sample, the detention of Mitric is to be
suspended immediately. Mitric and persons to be appointed by him are then
requested to negotiate at once to formulate their demands to Prime Minister
Lubbers.
All demands made by
me, Van Hulst, being:
A residence permit for Mitric,
Protection for the informant involved,
Bail payment of the agreed amount are
to be met in advance.
With regard to the
matter of the presence of representatives of foreign nations, this will be
rejected.”
No trifle thus, but
because the uranium sample was not delivered, the whole matter was eventually
blown off. Which does not mean, however that the stolen uranium did not exist.
It would be nice if Lubbers were to
also go public concerning this affair. But then preferably from A to Z.
Otherwise we continue to guess.
II
The intermediary,
Van Hulst, between the then prime minister Lubbers and the detained Slobodan
Mitric had not been chosen accidentally. Van Hulst had been, as it happens,
from the beginning involved in the afore-mentioned secret negotiations between
the delegation of Dutch businessmen and the motley crew from the Middle East
concerning the nuclear deal. And – a fortunate detail – he had arrived on
Augusts 4, 1984, because of a minor incident via a police cell in [the Dutch
town of] Maassluis, at the house of detention..
After two days, he got a visit from an
inspector, named “De Boer”, who invited him to work on a large forthcoming
project. Now,Van Hulst sat there anyways, you can annoy yourself literally to
death in jail, so why not? Within a couple days he got a new neighbour who had
been transferred from Leeuwarden [capital of the Dutch province of Friesland]
to Rotterdam. You can bet who that was, very well: Slobodan Mitric.
In the months afterwards, “Bob” Mitric
was to confide to his neighbour that he was busy closing a deal with the [Dutch
central] Ministry of General Affairs. He wanted to get out of jail in exchange
for disclosing the whereabouts of the stolen shipment of uranium. Would Van
Hulst act as an intermediary when he got out again? Well, Van Hulst wouldn’t’t
mind.
Two days before the annual hustle and
bustle concerning that stable in Bethlehem Van Hulst was freed. The first weeks
he heard nothing. But before the first week of January 1985 was over, he got a
phone call. If he would visit Bob a moment. Of course.
According to the slightly agitated
Mitric, the matter would come to a head and Van Hulst would be approached by a
couple of chaps who would close the deal. And indeed, that same evening Van
Hulst got a phone call. An unknown voice said:We are the people that Bob was
talking about this afternoon. We want to talk with you for a while. If you walk
now to the corner of the street, we will pick you up there.
The intermediary quickly put on his
coat, ran to the corner of the street and stepped in a car filled with two men
from [The Ministry of] General Affairs. After a short ride, the trio came to
the parking lot of a restaurant where the boys from the Ministry explained what
they wanted. If Van Hulst would cooperate in solving the matter, which Mitric
had brought forward. Van Hulst hesitated, but the boys from the Ministry are
known for their power of persuasion and Van Hulst finally came around. After he
was brought back home, one of the men said, In two hours you will receive a
telephone call.
And he was right. About twelve o’clock
the phone rang: With Kieboom. If you to go to Erasmus university tomorrow
morning, you will find me on the first floor at the Donner bookshop. There we
can talk further.
III
Any doubts that Van
Hulst, the intermediary of Slobodan Mitric, might have had about his
appointment with Jos Kieboom were entirely eliminated the next morning. He
found Lubbers’ consultant indeed on the agreed spot: the Donner bookshop on the
first floor of Erasmus University. Whether Van Hulst at that moment already
knew what kind of function Kieboom held, remains a question.
After some obligatory preliminaries,
the two gentlemen withdrew to a parlour. There Van Hulst unrolled the list of
demands by Mitric that, in his view of the slow course the negotiations, had
been modified repeatedly in the preceding period.
Kieboom listened to Van Hulst and said
patiently at the end of the conversation, Well, I know it now. Wait a while longer. I will call you again
and then I’ll take you to someone.
A few of days later, on Saturday
January 18, at the end of the afternoon, the intermediary got Kieboom on the
line, who asked him if he could be at the Kralinger golf club at seven o'clock.
There he would come by to pick up Van Hulst.
Properly on time, the two men met each
other again. This time at the parking lot of the golf club. Kieboom said, Now
I will bring you to someone with whom you can definitively close the deal.
They drove through the better part of
Kralingen to a villa on the corner of Lambertweg and walked in the dark along
the garden path to the front door, which opened almost immediately. Before he
knew it, Van Hulst stood in the study on the first floor; together with
Kieboom. A moment later the occupant of the house made his appearance: Ruud
Lubbers, the prime minister. And the conversation began.
IV
The basic list of
demands made by Slobodan Mitric was rather simple: official pardon after
delivery of the sample of uranium, a residence permit, protection for the
original informant and the deposit of three millions dollar in a Swiss bank
with a down payment of 1 million. Furthermore, the intermediary requested
Lubbers to find out if the British could possibly “take Mitric over” in matters
of housing him and a job with some British secret service. If London agreed to
this, Mitric would like to see that confirmed in an advertisement of [the
biggest Dutch daily newspaper] “De Telegraph”.
Lubbers did not find this a nice idea
immediately. Also, the proposal to set Mitric free in exchange for information
did not fall immediately into place. But after some insistence, he said with
his eyes squeezed, Ah, I don’t have to take care of that. But I know some
people who are perhaps interested in his knowledge and they have enough power
to secure his future.
Eventually, Lubbers even agreed to
place an ad in “De Telegraaf”, if the wishes of Mitric could be fulfilled. The
text of it read:
“F. Giesberts must
take the place of Martin. Sorry about half joker. This was fateful for him. The
BIG INDUSTRIALIST wants to first read the book of 239 pages before it is
definitively published. F. Giesberts has half the bait already. The vassal of
the big industrialist has the other half. M. Amman and film star, as a matter
of fact also a big madam, sit in the editorial commission. Don’t worry. You
were and remain a loner. Your friend, Frank Waterfoort.”
Cryptic, but not
unbreakable. M. Amman stood for the Israeli military intelligence service, the
film star for president Reagan, the big madam for premier Thatcher and the big
industrialist for Lubbers. The book of 239 pages was “The Dutch Mafia” that
Mitric had conceived [should be “Operation Twins” according to Mitric, note by
the translator] . But who was Martin, who according to the text apparently went
around the corner [i.e. died] previously, because he possessed the half joker?
Logically that could only be one:
Martinus Fens, who was murdered on December 17, 1984. Alias “beautiful Tinus”,
the uncrowned king of the underworld in The Hague and the protagonist in
Mitric’ masterwork [The Dutch Mafia,
not translated].
V
As mentioned in
this series, Slobodan Mitric gathered his knowledge concerning the shipment of
uranium, which floated around somewhere, as well as the nuclear deal between a
delegation of Dutch businessmen and a mixed party from the Middle East, in his
round of penitentiaries. But especially in Esserheem, where also Tinus Fens,
the king of the underworld at that time in The Hague, was jailed for smuggling
drugs.
In the early spring of 1984, beautiful
Tinus was released. Apparently everyone did not find that so amusing, because
in May of that year he was shot in Café Petit Paris in The Hague by a couple of
young hit-men. Tinus was a tough guy. He
survived the attack. But on December 17, the bell nevertheless tolled for him.
A North-African shot him from nearby through the back of his head.
According to newspapers from that time,
the gunman had been engaged by two other toppers from the scene in The Hague:
porno-king Henkie Bartels and gambling expert Henk Rijstenbil. During
interrogation and the following trial,
both the gunman and Rijstenbil denied
all charges levelled at them. They both had nothing to do with the murder.
Bartels sang like a canary. Consequence: Bartels and Rijstenbil went behind
bars for a long time. The North-African was allowed to leave for lack of proof.
A couple months after the sentence,
Bartels was sent home because of his frail health. That appeared to be in
Thailand where he spent five years before he departed to higher spheres.
The question remains whether the death
of Tinus Fens resulted indeed simply from a power struggle between him and the
duo Bartels/Rijstenbil or whether the scenario was a lot more complicated. A
scenario in which the nuclear question with which Mitric was playing joker also
had a role. Perhaps something at this late date for Rijstenbil’s lawyer Gerard
Spong.
VI
In order to keep
the pressure on, Mitric, after the visit by intermediary Giesberts on January
21 sent a letter to the house address of premier Lubbers with duplicates to the
American, British, French and Israeli embassies. The contents read as follows:
“Your Excellency,
In the first place
my best wishes for the New Year. By means of this letter, I want to turn to you
with some questions. The contents of this matter could damage you if they are
not true. For this reason, I have decided do let to this matter come directly
to you. It is not in my interests to cause you harm in any way.
1. Have you ordered
in December 1983 an investigation into the theft of uranium?
If yes:
a. Have you ordered
the intelligence service of the Ministry of General Affairs to speak with me on
your behalf in January 1984 concerning this matter?
b. Did the civil
servant of the intelligence service of your ministry, Mr. Mansveld, have to
negotiate with me on your behalf from January 1984 until July 20, 1984?
2. Did you order De
Telegraaf to place the following small add on your behalf on June 19, 1984?
‘Martin, your half
joker is worth as much as my half joker. The big industrialist is very much
interested in putting our jokers together. Greetings from Koos’.
If yes:
a. Did you know
that by placing this ad, you agreed to my conditions?
The big
industrialist is your code name, known at the Intelligence Service of [the
Ministry] General Affairs as well as by my informant in whose name I have done
the complete transaction with you.
b. Conditions were:
1. That I would be
granted the Dutch nationality.
2. That I would be
paid 3 million US dollars, 1 million cash in advance to me (that I would be
allowed to bring to Switzerland) and the rest by means of a written guarantee
by a notary. Plus half a million guilders cash for the first kilo uranium.
3. From you the
written guarantee that I would never be extradited to Yugoslavia against my
will.
4. From you the
written guarantee that I will never be prosecuted for this affair.
5. That all the
debts that my informant owes in taxes are remitted (about 10 million guilders).
6. That the name of
my informant will never be made public.
7. That my
informant be given a complete new identity.
8. Permission for
the import of goods, for this one time only, that are prohibited in The
Netherlands. This is important, because these goods are used as payment by
countries in the Middle East.
The detection of
these goods serves as additional evidence.
As you know, by
placing the above ad, you agreed to all the conditions.
3. Is it true that
the following decision was made at an emergency meeting on July 20:
a. That you as
Prime Minister (also Minister of General Affairs) agreed to start the
transaction with me?
b. That the
Minister of Foreign Affairs also agreed to my conditions?
c. That the
Minister of Justice did not agree?
Conclusion: That
the whole affair was covered up as a result of the negative position of the
Minister of Justice as enacted by his advisors, among others the public
prosecutor Mr. Van Os? The risk that this uranium will fall into enemy hands
and be used against the state of Israel will then be entirely your
responsibility. Not to forget the 10 barrels of radio-active waste that were
stolen from Philips-Eindhoven and that are in danger of being sold to the IRA.
4. Do you know F.
Giesberts?
5. Was F. Giesberts
with you at the end of December 1984?
a. Did you permit
Police Commissioner Blaauw to speak about the uranium issue with the
Intelligence Services of General Affairs?
b. Did you grant
him full powers to deal with me in future negotiations?
c. Did you receive
from Mr. F. Giesberts the text of the ad that was to be placed in the section
Small Ads of De Telegraaf?
‘F. Giesberts must
take the place of Martin. Sorry about half joker. This was fateful for him. The
BIG INDUSTRIALIST wants to first read the book of 239 pages before it is
definitively published. F. Giesberts has half the bait already. The vassal of
the big industrialist has the other half. M.Amman and film star, as a matter of
fact also a big madam, sit in the editorial commission. Don’t worry. You were
and remain a loner. Your friend, Frank Waterfort’.”
We know the
identity of intermediary Giesberts as well as that of Mitric’s informant, but
for the time being see no need to reveal their names.
VII
If we can believe
the data from the letter Slobodan Mitric wrote to prime minster Lubbers
dated January 21,1985 then the stolen
uranium affair and – be it to a lesser
degree – the secret negotiations on Cyprus lasted more than a year. From
December 1983 to in any case January 1985.
Quite soon after his first edict to
General Affairs (GA), Mitric, according
to the same data in the Schevening house of detention, was visited by an agent
from IDB [Dutch CIA] operating under GA. It was Koos Mansveld, who introduced
himself to Mitric as Mansfield. During
the next months agent Mansfield would visit his detained informant numerous
times. First in Scheveningen and after March 27,
Those visits must have given the
Montenegrin karate expert the impression that his information was taken
seriously by the IDB. Question is whether the above sketch of events is a
figment of the imagination of the caged ex-agent of Tito or the naked truth.
The latter.
This we can distil from a report of a
staff member of the Haarlem detention center that he wrote at the end of July
1984, when Mitric was transferred to Leeuwarden. In that report, intended for
his colleagues in the Frisian capital, he wrote, among other things, the
following:
“During his stay here, the person
concerned attracted the interest of the foreign intelligence service, operating
under the ministry of General Affairs. Mr. Mansfield, a member of this service
[IDB], paid him numerous visits. This all happened in consultation with Mr. Van
Hylkema and Mr. Van Os, Public prosecutor in The Hague.”
We asked the RVD [Public Relations
Office of the Kingdom of The Netherlands] concerning this affair. The then head
of this Office, also operating under GA, Hans van der Voet, admitted to our
enormous surprise that a civil servant from GA had indeed visited Mitric.
Further, he do not want go. Van der Voet: I can only say to you that it is true.
VIII
Not long after his
detailed letter to Lubbers dated January 20, 1985 the sleuths called in by GA
came to the conclusion that Mitric heard a nuclear bell ringing, but did not
know exactly where the clapper was. That was sufficient to lower the storm flag
and proceed to damage control. In other words, eliminating loose cannon Mitric.
For example, during the appeal that the furious karate man had made in a law
suit that three women had filed against him because of rape. Remarkable detail:
one of the women was the former wife of Mitric’ informant in the uranium
affair.
The ex-agent of Tito vehemently denied
the charges and claimed that it was a plot by the government in order to keep
him behind bars and in this way to prevent him from bringing anything
concerning the uranium affair into the open. For this reason, it was not
astonishing that his lawyer at that time, Mr. H.C.W.F. Meijer in September of
that year tried to place a number of persons on the witness list who were not
directly involved with the [so-called] rape of the three ladies. They were
successively:
“Dr. R.F.M.
Lubbers, Lambertweg 4, Rotterdam.
He can explain that
he in his function as minister-president in or around December 1983 ordered the
Foreign Intelligence Service [IDB] operating under the ministry of General
Affairs to contact S. Mitric, that he personally followed this contact, that he
also ordered an investigation into the person of S. Mitric, that his ministry
of General Affairs on the basis of the results of this research became
convinced that afore-mentioned S. Mitric did not commit these rapes and that he
then in or around January 1985 through F. Giesberts got in touch again with S.
Mitric;
Mansfield (initials
unknown), at least a person who used this name as his own, c/o Executive Board
Foreign Intelligence Service [IDB] Plein 20, The Hague.
He can explain that
he was ordered by Dr. R.F.M. Lubbers, mentioned under a, to investigate the
theft of a certain amount of plutonium, that he therefore approached S. Mitric
and then established multiple contacts concerning this affair, that he came
with S. Mitric to a sort of transaction, according to which S. Mitric was
promised, among other things, money, acquisition of the Dutch nationality, at
least a refugee passport, a guarantee against deportation from the territory of
the Kingdom of The Netherlands, protection of S. Mitric against possible
reprisals and an investigation into the rape charges levelled against S.
Mitric;
Dr. J.P. Kieboom,
Zeekant
He can explain that
he in or around the months of November and December 1983 was approached on
behalf of S. Mitric, that he then established contact with Dr. R.F.M. Lubbers,
that the latter on the advice of Kieboom entered into proposals by Mitric and
that an amount of 300,000,000 West-German marks was lent by the Dutch
government to the Palestinian Hassan Sabaidi;
Mr. F.G.J. of Os,
Barnsteenhorst 370, The Hague.
He can explain that
and why he attempted in an unlawful manner to put pressure on S. Mitric’ lawyer
at that time, Mr. L.D.H. Hammer, why he advised Dr. R.F.M. Lubbers to make no
appointments with S. Mitric, that he said to be able prove that the statements
by S. Mitric were at variance with the truth, that he ordered S. Mitric to be
liquidated in the house of detention in Leeuwarden and that he called S. Mitric
a rapist;
Mr. H.W. of
Hylkema, Princess Margrietlaan 17, Voorburg.
He can explain that
he advised Dr. R.F.M. Lubbers to
maintain no further contact with S. Mitric, that he knew that S. Mitric was a
rapist - or, in case he did not know this, that and why he has nevertheless
stated this - and that he ordered the liquidation of S. Mitric in the house of
detention in Leeuwarden;
Mr. G.P.H. van
Doeveren, Norgstraat 67, The Hague.
He can explain that
he set the detained H. de Wolf in or around august 1983 free and why he did this,
that he advised Dr. R.F.M. Lubbers to presuppose that S. Mitric was a liar, and
that the amount of uranium and plutonium that Mitric was talking about was
‘worthless stuff’, that he called S. Mitric a rapist and that by all odds he
incited women to level rape charges against S. Mitric.”
Although for
Mitric, plutonium and uranium were apparently one and the same thing, there
remains sufficient material to scratch yourself firmly behind the ears.
Liquidation orders. A mysterious loan to
Hassan Sabaidi? What was that all about?
Of course, you will hasten to say, the
above-mentioned witnesses were not summoned. According to the presiding judge
of the law court Mr. Wedeven and solicitor general Mr. Ficq, they had
absolutely nothing to do with the rape case. In spite of the fact that the
desired high profile witnesses stayed away, Mitric nevertheless tried during
the court session to establish a link between the rape affair and the uranium
matter. To no avail. He lost the case and remained behind bars. Which does not
mean that the uranium matter was shelved and that it indeed concerned worthless
stuff.
IX
As has been said,
the relation between Mitric and the Foreign Intelligence Service [IDB] operating under Lubbers’
Ministry of General Affairs lasted more than one year. But how did that
relation come about? That was through a letter, which the ex-agent of Tito sent
to the turret [Prime Minister Lubbers’ parliamentary office in The Hague] and
which contains the following moving strophes:
An international organisation
which consists exclusively of Islamic, well-situated fanatics aims at all costs
to construct a number of nuclear bombs and to have them explode on the
territory of Israel. This organisation had nothing except money. Therefore it
was forced to look for experts abroad. This way they came into contact with
some Dutch and Belgian businessmen. Thus, the plan construed by these fanatics
slowly took shape. The organisation started by buying the raw materials necessary
for the production of nuclear bombs.
They bought in the
USA: 600 kilos of Uranium-
Furthermore they
bought ten barrels of mass necessary for the creation of the nuclear link.
Later it appeared that this mass was nothing else than radioactive waste,
stolen from Philips-Eindhoven.
In June/July
A member of the Secret Service of Syria
A member of the Secret Service of Lybia
A Jordan-Palestinian oil-sheik
A civil servant of the Dutch Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (double agent Warschau Pact)
A Dutch businessman (as of now code
name Giesberts)
A nuclear physicist/engineer of Italian
origin
A chemist/engineer or nuclear physicist
from the Middle East
This meeting was
strictly secret. The following was decided. Because all the material that the
organisation had until then bought was not suited for making a nuclear bomb, an
advance of 20 million dollar was paid to buy proper material. With that money,
60 kilos Uranium-238 (99.3 percent) were bought in Belgium. The leader of the
group who provided this U-238 is an ex-minister of the Belgian government. The
transaction between purchasers and salesmen was arbitrated by a civil servant
from [the Ministry] of Foreign Affairs and Giesberts.
Interesting is that
during the meeting on Cyprus the aim behind the purchase of uranium was
discussed: making a couple of nuclear bombs and to let them explode in Israel
and Great Britain. Giesberts became scared, but he could no longer go back.
Giesberts sought contact with me and asked for advice in finding a way out.
After I had given Giesberts the
guarantee that I would never against his will say anything to third parties, he
told me everything. We then agreed that I would negotiate on his behalf with
the Dutch government.
F. Giesberts can
provide:
The complete identity of all persons
involved
60 kilos of U-238
10 barrels of radioactive debris
An illegal nuclear laboratory within
the Benelux.
According to F.
Giesberts the organisation giving the orders has paid, after 20 million dollar
in advance in 1982, another 100 million in the form of:
a.
Money. Hidden in the diplomatic luggage of a very well-known Dutch lawyer and
transported by the aforementioned civil servant of Foreign Affairs.
b. A
number of transports of 10,000 kilos hashish;
c. A
number of transports of 15,000 kilos marihuana;
d. A
number of transports of 50 kilos heroin;
Total
wholesale trade value 100 million dollars.
Gold
valued at 250 million dollars. This has been not yet transferred to the
salesmen (ex-minister Belgium). It is held in an African country.
Remarkable
concoction, from which in any case it appears that the makers did not know too
much concerning the enrichment procedure of uranium and the difference between
U-238 and U-235. Moreover, it is clear that Mitric and the enigmatic Giesberts
had known each other earlier than was suggested in part 2 of this series. But
for the rest, there were nevertheless a couple of tasty balls in the soup.
Lubbers thought that obviously too and sent agent Mansfield to the jug to see
if Mitric had more enticing things to tell. And that he had.
X
Mitric told a lot about
Fens, at that time king of the underworld in The Hague. Part of it he had drawn
from the tales of someone who maintained close contact with beautiful Tinus:
Frans de Wit, alias Papa Blanca. A contractor who had also had some amorous
affairs with Dame Justitia from which he did not escape completely intact. One
of his customers was supposedly Hollandia Kloos. A company of the family
Lubbers that was governed by Ruud and Rob. [1]
That did not mean that Papa could not
only live for a while on state costs, but that he had to cough up some ten
million to pay premiums and tax money. Correct. De Wit was Mitric’ informant in
the uranium issue. And not to forget in the background of the affair: the
secret negotiations between a delegation of Dutch businessmen and the not so
lively club from the Middle East. And what Mitric came know, Tinus Fens had
already known for a long time. As already related in part 5 of this series,
during the investigations of the IDB-agent Koos Mansveld and other sleuths,
initiated by prime minister Lubbers, Fens was shot twice for his job. The last
attack, on December 17, 1984, he did not survive (see part 5).
Oddly enough earlier that year, on 28
Augusts, another intimate of Mitric who was aware of the two hazardous affairs,
died suddenly. That was Kurt Görlitz, a prominent member of a secret
organisation under the guidance of Hans Teengs Gerritsen, the bosom friend of
prince Bernhard (see above all part VI of the “De schaduwkommando van de Prins”
on www.stelling.nl/ morgenster, a series that was also to be found on the [now
closed] website of Theo van Gogh “De gezonde roker”). That same week Mitric was
transferred to Leeuwarden. In spite of his loud protests. Mitric was afraid
that he would be assassinated there on orders of a couple of big shots at the
Ministry of Justice (see part VIII of this series).
To remain in the same sphere: on
November 20, 1983 Cor Beets, owner of the largest Café for stolen goods in
Amsterdam, De Metro, was murdered in his house above his business. Two Yugoslavians
and an adventurous inhabitant from De Rijp, a rural village in North Holland,
were apprehended. Although the murder weapon in the house of the Yugoslav in Purmerend
was found, the trio, because of lack of
proof, were shortly thereafter able to sniff fresh air again. According to the
moustached chaps from the Central Research Information Service (CRI) who were
regularly tapping Cor’s telephone and his business connections, Beets was,
together with Braspenninx (a living legend in the smuggler world of that time),
busy with an “enormous deal”. This concerned a shipment of uranium that was
stored in the port of Antwerp (see part 9 for Mitric’ references to the role
played by a Belgian ex-minister and a party of businessmen in the uranium
affair). A slightly bloody tale. Time for more cheerful news.
XI
If there was one
person exactly aware of the ins and outs of the nuclear affair in which
Slobodan Mitric was to play a temporary role, then this must have been
Giesberts. In the article “Steekspel rond een uranium-deal” (Duel Over an
Uranium Deal) on the website “De morgenster”, it is described how the man, who
in January 1985 placed the demands of the Montenegrin karate master on the
table in Lubbers’ home, got involved in this not so stringy affair. How through
mega-conman Guido Haak in Lebanon he got to know the Palestinian businessman
Hassan Zubaidi. And later also his partner Rifat Assad, the then head of the
Syrian Secret Service and uncle of the current Syrian president. That was in
Cyprus. Because both Zubaidi and Assad were from the beginning part of the
Middle-Eastern delegation at the successive secret discussions with the
delegation of Dutch businessmen, who were mentioned by Mitric in his letters to
Prime Minister Lubbers.
We have never managed to find out
exactly which Dutch companies (besides Ballast Nedam and Hollandia Kloos, which
were mentioned by Giesberts) all wanted to lick the pot of the planned
enrichment deal with Urenco in the form of compensation orders. But in our
laborious dialogues in the course of years with the Dutch intermediary,
however, two names fell of chaps, who were heading the greedy Dutch club: Van
Schaik and Lubbers.
Concerning the question which Van
Schaik it was, Giesberts was less explicit, but eventually it became clear that
it must have been the engineer J.J. van Schaik, not an unknown at both Royal
Shell and the Amsterdam engineering office Comprimo. Comprimo? Correct. The
same company that in the same years played a secret role in the laying of the
nuclear playing field of Dr. Qadeer Khan in Pakistan.
Also concerning the question which
Lubbers was on the field in Cyprus, Giesberts was little accommodating. We
suggested Rob, but Giesberts named the name of Paul at a single occasion (see
footnote ). Too bad, but because of Giesberts’ understandable reservation, we
have not been able to really answer this question.
Van Schaik and Lubbers were supported
on Cyprus by a nice battery of experts. It was after all not peanuts. In this
type of deals, it was not possible those years for Iran, for whom the enriched
uranium was intended and which lay heavily under fire, to simply transfer the
bread to The Netherlands and leave it at that.
A most charming scheme of compensation orders was thus concocted for a
whole range of Dutch firms that would receive amounts much larger than normal.
What would happen to the surplus amounts is easy to guess.
That the phased negotiations did not
run smoothly is an understatement. Giesberts:
It wasn’t easy. At a certain moment Van Schaik could
stand it no longer. He yelled: ‘What am I supposed to do in heaven’s name?’
After internal consultation, he decided to let everything rebound. Panic
naturally. The meeting was adjourned, but nevertheless continued after a while.
After both sides had consulted the home front, it was possible to close a new
deal. We had some very nerve-racking moments.
Do we have but one
source for this charade on Cyprus? No, two. The other one will come next.
XII
Truck driver Cor J.
turned nothing down. This way he performed during his impressive career not
only logistically high calibre feats for the Italian mafia, but just as
cheerfully took to the road for Mossad or Dutch businesses. Just to name a few:
In first half of the seventies, he worked for the freight carrier Frans Maas,
nowadays listed on the [Dutch] stock exchange, but around 1976 he stepped over
to the transport company Stoof in Breda. Not long afterwards the following
transpired:
Cor: It must have
been in 1977 when I drove parts of a nuclear reactor to Portugal. With a double
semi-trailer and two cranes.
KM: How did you know that they were parts of a
nuclear reactor?
Cor: That was
written in the papers.
KM: Do you know what the destination was?
Cor: No, I don’t
know. I had to pick up that cargo in the port of Rotterdam and transport it to
an open area in the port of Lisbon. That transport was accompanied by a whole
swarm of Dutchmen in inconspicuous cars. According to me, they were boys of the
Royal Engineers, because they knew damn well what they were doing. It was,
however, a long ride. With a double semi-trailer and such a heavy cargo you
don’t get anywhere terribly fast. But those boys had permits for the complete
route. Nowhere underway did we have any difficulties.
KM: Was it because of this haul that you were
approached later for that odd job on Cyprus?
Cor: I think so.
They knew about it in any case. But I was not engaged immediately to go to
Cyprus. That came later. First I attended a couple meetings in hotel Gascogne
in Eindhoven and a hotel in Antwerp.
KM: Do you still know who were there?
Cor: I remember
that there was a German captain of a coaster. But that’s all. I had stowed away
my papers in my box, but they were been pinched. I remember that Mr.
Diepenbroek of Trénité van Doorne was involved in this matter and a lawyer’s
office from Rotterdam by the name of Sjollema. After that I was in Cyprus a
couple of times.
KM: How many people were involved?
Cor: Always at
least some thirty males. Arabs, Italians.
KM: Do you remember who was in control on the
Dutch side? Van Schaik? Lubbers?
Cor: Van Schaik
says nothing me, but there was a Lubbers present.
KM: Which Lubbers? Rob? Paul?
Cor: No idea at
all.
KM: Did you know that it concerned a nuclear
matter?
Cor: Yes,
naturally. It concerned the transport of a large cooling system.
KM: Did it go through?
Cor: That I don’t
know, because I was caught in a smuggling job. And I got a visit from three
gentlemen from Mossad.
KM: ?????
Cor: I was fishing
from the Beemsterbrug [bridge in Purmerend, North Holland]. They said that I
had to stop with that job, otherwise some
nasty things would happen. I told
them then that I had also done some
things for Mossad and that they could confirm that in Amsterdam, at the consulate. But they knew that. Therefore,
it remained a warning. But I did get scared as hell.
Two witnesses
thus for the “Cyprus project” that
was handled in 1984/1985 by Slobodan Mitric and for Prime Minister
Lubbers reason to send IDB agents in the field. Very likely in order to prevent
further leaks. Stay tuned.*
* * *
[1] Ruud and Rob Lubbers took care of the daily
chores of the firm, until Ruud became prime minister at the end of 1982. From
that moment on Rob alone became the boss, but rumor has it that his brother
Paul, who lived just across the Belgian border, also had his fingers in the
pot.
* As far as could be ascertained, no sequel to this article appeared on
this website.